Stellantis will report its first annual loss since formation when detailed 2025 results drop February 26. The company recorded €500 million adjusted operating income in the first half before losing €1.2 to €1.5 billion in the second half, according to preliminary guidance issued February 6 and confirmed across Automotive News, Motor1, and Assembly Magazine reporting.
The operating loss is bad enough. The net loss is catastrophic. Stellantis took €22.2 billion in charges during the second half of 2025 alone, driving a net loss between €19 and €21 billion for H2 and roughly €19 to €21 billion for the full year after accounting for the €3.2 billion H1 net loss.
That's $26 billion in charges. To put that in perspective, Stellantis' entire market capitalization after the announcement was approximately $21 billion. The writedown exceeded the company's total value. Shares collapsed 25 percent to €7.50, the lowest since the 2021 merger creating Stellantis from FCA and PSA Group, per Fintool analysis.
The company that promised 100 percent EV sales in Europe by 2030 just wrote off more money unwinding that strategy than most automakers are worth.
What The €22 Billion Paid For
The charges break into three categories, according to Stellantis SEC filings documented by The Deep Dive and Stock Titan:
€14.7 billion: Realigning product plans away from EVs to meet customer demand and new U.S. emissions regulations. This includes platform impairments, canceled programs like the Ram 1500 BEV, and reduced volume projections for ongoing EV programs.
€2.4 billion: Resizing the EV supply chain after overbuilding capacity for demand that never materialized.
€5.4 billion: Other operational charges, dominated by €4.1 billion from warranty provision increases and €1.3 billion in restructuring costs primarily from European workforce reductions.
The Ram 1500 BEV was canceled before reaching production. The Dodge Charger Daytona EV struggled to find buyers despite aggressive incentives. Jeep's planned electric lineup was quietly shelved. The company spent billions developing vehicles customers refused to purchase.
CEO Antonio Filosa called it "overestimating the pace of the energy transition that distanced us from many car buyers' real world needs, means, and desires," per official statements. Translation: we bet the company on EVs nobody wanted and now we're paying for it.
The Dividend Is Gone
Stellantis suspended its 2026 dividend citing the net loss. Shareholders who expected payouts from a company that generated €15.2 billion net profit in 2021, €16.8 billion in 2022, €18.6 billion in 2023, and €11.4 billion in 2024 get nothing in 2026.
The board also authorized up to €5 billion in non convertible subordinated perpetual hybrid bonds, according to official SEC filings. That's corporate finance speak for expensive debt used when companies need cash but don't want to dilute shareholders through equity raises.
CFO João Laranjo insisted "we are not contemplating any equity raise" when asked directly about capital structure, per Fintool coverage. But authorizing €5 billion in hybrid bonds signals balance sheet concerns even with €46 billion industrial liquidity at year end.
Dividends gone. Hybrid bonds authorized. Stock down 25 percent. Writedowns exceeding market cap. This is what strategic failure looks like in quarterly reports.
The Numbers That Actually Matter
Stellantis generated €78 to €80 billion net revenue in H2 2025 despite the losses. Consolidated shipments rose 11 percent year over year to 2.82 million units in the second half. North America led with 39 percent growth. Q4 alone shipped 1.5 million units, up 9 percent, with North America climbing 43 percent.
Those operational improvements got buried under €22 billion in charges. The business is selling more vehicles. Customers are buying trucks and SUVs with combustion engines. The Jeep Grand Cherokee L and Wagoneer S are moving. Ram pickups with Hemi V8s are selling. The Dodge Charger SixPack two door coupe returned.
Everything Stellantis canceled or deemphasized during the EV push is now being revived because that's what customers actually want. The Jeep Cherokee and Compass came back. The Hemi V8 returned to Ram 1500 lineup. Gas powered variants dominate sales across every brand.
The company abandoned its electric future and customers responded by buying more vehicles. But first, Stellantis had to write off tens of billions spent developing products for a market that didn't exist.
What Comes Next
Stellantis guides mid single digit net revenue growth for 2026 with low single digit adjusted operating margin. Industrial free cash flow improves but remains negative. Positive free cash flow isn't expected until 2027.
The company faces €1.6 billion in net tariff expenses during 2026, up from €1.2 billion in 2025. Another €2 billion in cash payments related to the H2 2025 charges hit 2026. Total cash outflows from the €22 billion writedown reach €6.5 billion over four years.
Warranty costs remain elevated. The €4.1 billion increase in contractual warranty provisions suggests quality problems across the fleet requiring expensive fixes. Those costs accumulate as more vehicles age into the periods where defects surface.
European workforce reductions continue. Stellantis closed plants and cut thousands of jobs during 2025. More cuts are planned as the company shrinks capacity to match demand reality rather than the inflated EV projections Tavares used to justify expansion.
The Enlarged Europe region faces particular pressure. Diesel sales collapsed. EV adoption stalled. Chinese manufacturers captured market share with cheaper electric alternatives. Stellantis maintained second place among European automakers with 16 percent market share, but volume fell 6 percent year over year.
Coverage from GaukMotorBuzz.com has documented how Stellantis's strategic reversals mirror broader industry retreat from aggressive electrification timelines that assumed consumer demand would materialize through policy rather than product appeal.
The Investment Community Response
Stock analysts revised price targets downward immediately. The 25 percent drop wasn't enough according to some. The writedown exceeding market cap means the market values Stellantis's ongoing business at essentially zero after accounting for the strategic failure.
Ford and GM posted similar EV writedowns during 2024 and 2025. Ford suspended its three row electric SUV program. GM scaled back Ultium platform investments. Every Detroit automaker overestimated EV demand and is now paying for it.
But Stellantis's €22 billion charge dwarfs competitors. That's nearly the entire amount the company pledged to invest in electrification at EV Day in July 2021. Four years later, they're writing off that investment and reverting to combustion engines.
The May 21 Investor Day will outline Stellantis's new product strategy. Expect diesel to feature prominently in Europe. Combustion engines dominate North American plans. Hybrids bridge the gap. Full electrification gets pushed into an indefinite future where customers might actually want it.
What This Teaches
Stellantis bet tens of billions on regulatory mandates forcing EV adoption regardless of consumer preference. When governments weakened targets and subsidies evaporated, demand collapsed. The company built products for a policy environment that changed before vehicles reached customers.
Every canceled program, every impaired platform, every restructured supply chain represents a strategic decision that proved wrong. The Ram 1500 BEV was supposed to compete with Ford F-150 Lightning and Rivian R1T. Customers kept buying gas powered Rams instead. Stellantis spent billions developing a truck it canceled before production.
The Dodge Charger Daytona EV with fake exhaust sounds was mocked relentlessly. Dealers couldn't move inventory despite incentives. Dodge eventually confirmed gas powered versions for customers who wanted actual V8s instead of simulated theatre.
Platform investments supporting multiple BEV launches across brands now sit impaired on balance sheets. Supply chain capacity built for ambitious volume targets exceeds actual demand. Workforce reductions eliminate jobs created during the expansion that never should have happened.
This is what overconfidence costs. Stellantis leadership assumed regulatory pressure would overcome consumer resistance. They assumed subsidies would remain permanent. They assumed Chinese manufacturers couldn't compete on price. They assumed wrong on every assumption.
The €22 billion writedown quantifies that failure in accounting terms. The canceled dividend, authorized hybrid bonds, and collapsed stock price translate it into shareholder pain. The thousands of eliminated jobs make it human.
The February 26 Report
Full year 2025 results release Wednesday. The preliminary guidance confirmed the broad strokes. Final numbers will detail exactly how bad each region performed and where the writedowns landed.
Investors will scrutinize 2026 guidance for signs the worst has passed. Management promises profitability returns. The question is whether anyone believes them after they spent four years promising an electric future that just cost €22 billion to unwind.
Stellantis formed in 2021 from the merger of two struggling automakers who lacked scale to survive independently. FCA brought profitable North American trucks and Jeep. PSA brought efficient European operations and Peugeot. Together they were supposed to compete globally.
Four years later, they've recorded their first annual loss writing off the electric strategy that was supposed to secure their future. The combustion engines they planned to phase out are now the products generating revenue. The EVs they spent billions developing got canceled or sit unsold.
The irony is perfect. Stellantis abandoned the strategy that led to losses and immediately started shipping more vehicles. Customers voted with their wallets. They chose trucks and SUVs with V8s over electric alternatives. Management finally listened, but only after losing €22 billion learning that lesson.
Wednesday's results will confirm what everyone already knows. Stellantis bet wrong. The company survived. Shareholders lost money. Employees lost jobs. And the electric revolution they promised in 2021 turned into the most expensive strategic failure in automotive history.
All that money for not much more than an accounting lesson on why betting against consumer preference rarely works out.