Ford Motor Company's electric vehicle division has accumulated staggering losses totaling $35.1 billion since 2022 when combining $15.6 billion in operating losses with a recent $19.5 billion asset write-down, according to company financial disclosures released in January 2026. The losses dwarf Ford's total net income of $11.1 billion over the same period, meaning the automaker's EV strategy has cost more than three times what the entire company earned in profit from all operations including its profitable truck and commercial vehicle divisions.
Through the first three quarters of 2025 alone, Ford's Model e electric vehicle division lost $3.6 billion despite selling approximately 115,000 EVs during that period. This represents an average loss of roughly $31,300 per electric vehicle sold, meaning Ford pays customers thousands of dollars for the privilege of selling them electric cars when accounting for development costs, manufacturing expenses, and marketing investments.
The $19.5 billion write-down announced in Ford's fourth quarter 2025 results reflects the company's acknowledgment that previous investments in EV manufacturing capacity, battery technology partnerships, and related infrastructure will not generate the returns originally projected. Write-downs represent accounting adjustments when asset values prove lower than balance sheet figures suggest, forcing companies to recognize that past investments were worth less than anticipated.
"We overestimated how quickly EV adoption would occur and underestimated the capital intensity required to compete effectively in this space," stated Jim Farley, Ford CEO, during the company's earnings call on January 21st, 2026. "The losses are unacceptable, and we're fundamentally restructuring our EV strategy to focus on profitability rather than volume at any cost. That means fewer models, more disciplined capital allocation, and acceptance that EV transition will take longer than we projected in 2021 and 2022."
Ford's EV troubles contrast sharply with the company's profitable traditional vehicle operations. The Blue Oval division encompassing combustion-engine vehicles including the F-150 pickup, Explorer SUV, and various commercial vans generated substantial profits throughout 2022 to 2025, as did the Pro division serving commercial and fleet customers. These profitable segments essentially subsidize massive EV losses, raising questions about whether Ford's strategy serves shareholder interests or simply burns capital chasing market share in a segment where profitability remains elusive.
The losses stem from multiple factors. Development costs for electric platforms, battery technology, and software systems required billions in upfront investment that won't be recovered for years given modest sales volumes. Manufacturing electric vehicles costs more than combustion equivalents due to expensive battery packs and new production processes requiring different equipment and worker training. Marketing expenses to educate consumers and stimulate EV demand add further costs without guaranteeing sales success.
Ford launched its EV push aggressively in 2021 and 2022, announcing plans to invest over $50 billion in electrification through 2026 and targeting annual production capacity of 2 million EVs by 2026. The company introduced the Mustang Mach-E crossover in 2020, followed by the F-150 Lightning electric pickup in 2022 and the E-Transit commercial van. Additional models including electric Explorer and Capri crossovers arrived in European markets during 2024 and 2025.
However, consumer demand failed to materialize at projected levels. The F-150 Lightning, positioned as a transformative product that would electrify America's best-selling vehicle, achieved sales of just 24,000 units in 2024 compared to over 750,000 combustion F-150s. The Mach-E sold approximately 41,000 units in 2024, respectable but far below the volumes needed to justify billions in development and tooling costs. The E-Transit found modest success in commercial fleets but remained a niche product.
Price cuts implemented throughout 2024 and 2025 to stimulate demand further eroded margins already under pressure. The F-150 Lightning saw sticker prices reduced by up to $10,000 in attempts to move inventory, while Mach-E discounts reached $7,000 to $8,000. These incentives helped clear dealer lots but guaranteed that vehicles sold at losses that widened the already catastrophic financial bleeding.
Battery costs, while declining from peaks in 2021 and 2022, remained higher than Ford initially projected. The company's partnership with South Korean battery manufacturer SK On to build battery plants in Kentucky and Tennessee involved billions in joint investment that now appears optimistic given demand realities. These facilities, sized for production volumes Ford no longer expects to achieve in the near term, represent stranded capital earning no returns.
Competition intensified beyond Ford's expectations. Tesla maintained market leadership while cutting prices aggressively to defend share. Chinese manufacturers including BYD developed competitive EVs at price points Ford cannot match. Traditional rivals including General Motors, Volkswagen, and Hyundai launched their own electric models, fragmenting demand across dozens of vehicles competing for a customer base growing more slowly than anticipated.
The write-down and operating losses forced Ford to acknowledge strategic misjudgment. In 2021, when announcing ambitious EV plans, company executives projected that electric vehicles would achieve profitability parity with combustion vehicles by 2025. That target now appears impossibly optimistic, with current projections suggesting Ford's EVs won't reach profitability until 2027 or 2028 at earliest, and only if demand growth accelerates substantially.
The $35.1 billion total loss since 2022 exceeds the entire market capitalization of some established automakers. For comparison, Nissan's market cap hovered around $31 billion in early 2026, meaning Ford burned more on EVs than Nissan's entire stock market value. The losses also exceed Ford's annual revenue from entire product categories, highlighting the staggering scale of capital consumed by the EV strategy.
Shareholder reactions proved predictably negative. Ford's stock price declined 7 percent in trading following the earnings announcement, with analysts downgrading ratings and reducing price targets. Activist investors questioned whether management possessed the discipline to halt further EV losses or whether the company would continue throwing capital at an unprofitable strategy out of fear that abandoning electrification would leave Ford behind competitors.
"At some point, you have to acknowledge reality and stop the bleeding," wrote one analyst at investment bank Bernstein in a note to clients following Ford's results. "Ford cannot afford to lose $30,000 per EV indefinitely hoping demand eventually materializes. The company needs profitability now, not promises of future EV profits that may never arrive."
Ford's revised strategy announced alongside the results includes delaying some planned EV launches, reducing production targets for existing models, and shifting focus toward hybrid vehicles that combine combustion engines with electric motors. Hybrids avoid the high battery costs that make pure EVs unprofitable while still offering improved fuel economy and reduced emissions that satisfy regulatory requirements and environmentally conscious buyers.
The company also announced it would explore licensing its electric vehicle technology to other manufacturers rather than attempting to build EV volumes entirely through in-house production. This strategy, if successful, could generate licensing revenue and reduce capital intensity, though finding partners willing to pay for Ford technology when Chinese manufacturers offer competitive alternatives at lower costs presents challenges.
The losses raise existential questions about legacy automaker EV strategies. If Ford, with its engineering expertise, manufacturing scale, and dealer network, cannot make EVs profitable after investing $35 billion, what hope do other traditional manufacturers have? General Motors reported similar though slightly smaller EV losses. Stellantis and Volkswagen struggle with profitability challenges in their electric divisions. Only Tesla among volume manufacturers produces EVs profitably, and even Tesla's margins have compressed under competitive pressure.
Perhaps the entire premise of rapid EV transition was flawed. Consumer demand, infrastructure readiness, and technology maturity may require decades rather than the aggressive timelines manufacturers adopted under political pressure and competitive anxiety about being left behind. Ford's $35 billion lesson might be that betting the company on transformations that haven't yet occurred proves extraordinarily expensive when reality fails to match optimistic projections.
For Ford workers, suppliers, dealers, and shareholders, the losses create uncertainty. Will the company survive this strategic blunder or will the capital consumption eventually force dramatic restructuring? Ford's strong truck and commercial vehicle profits provide cushion that many manufacturers lack, but even those cash flows cannot subsidize EV losses indefinitely without consequences for dividends, capital investment, and competitive position.
The $35.1 billion represents more than accounting entries on financial statements. It represents factories built for vehicles customers don't want in sufficient quantities, workers trained for jobs producing money-losing products, and capital that could have been returned to shareholders or invested in profitable operations instead consumed by a strategy that delivered losses three times larger than the company's entire profit. Whether this proves a painful transition toward eventual success or a historic strategic failure won't be clear for years. But right now, in early 2026, it looks like one of the most expensive corporate mistakes in automotive history.